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Abstract 
The purpose of our work is to inquire whether or not economics studying has a relevant effect on the social process of molding 
values, beliefs and attitudes, a crucial element of the trust-building process in democratic societies. According to what was argued 
by several authors, mainstream economics, based on the model of self-interest, corresponding to rational, maximizing, 
individualistic representative agents, tends to produce relevant indoctrinating effects, creating or reinforcing both political 
conservatism and selfishness among students. In this paper a contribution for these discussions is made, based on the results of a 
survey performed in Portugal, referring to a considerable diversity of samples (economics students, other students and ordinary 
citizens of both rural and urban milieus) and being applied in three different years: 2006, 2009 and 2012. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of our work is to inquire whether or not economics education has a relevant effect on the social process 
of molding values, beliefs and attitudes, a crucial element of the trust-building process in all democratic societies. 
Mainstream economics, whose models are mostly based on a rational, self-interested, maximizing and individualistic 
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“representative agent”, the so-called homo economicus, has arguably implicit, and in some cases even explicit 
indoctrinating effects. Take as an example the case correspondent to what Joseph Stigler (1984) called “the economist 
as a preacher”; for an interesting discussion about fairness and the assumptions of economics see also Kahneman et al 
(1986); a cogitation on altruism and economics is produced by Simon (1993), whereas a discussion of the 
indoctrination and selfish-inductor effects of economics-and-business studying is the main subject of Meier and Frey 
(2004) and Frey and Meyer (2005); on the other hand, a critical view of this literature is exposed in Lanteri (2008). 
There is a considerable number of studies comparing the values, preferences, attitudes and behaviors of economists 
with those of other professionals or the general public at large; a significant, albeit not exhaustive list of empirical 
exercises of this variety should include Marwell and Ames (1981), Carter and Irons (1991), Frank, Gilovich, and 
Regan (1996), Laband and Beil (1999), Frank and Schultze (2000), Kirchgässner (2005; 2014), Cipriani, Lubian, and 
Zago (2009), Bauman and Rose (2011), and Hole (2013). On a global balance, it appears to be reasonably well 
documented that economics students and professionals tend to show an above average self-interested behavior in free-
rider experiments, ultimatum bargaining games, surveys on charitable giving and Prisoner’s Dilemma contexts. 
In this paper we intend to contribute for this literature with different empirical evidence, namely the results of a 
survey on the Social Building of Trust in Portugal, in which we confront the results obtained for two samples of 376 
and 650 economics students (collected, respectively, in 2006 and 2012 from ISEG, University of Lisbon) with those 
produced by two other samples: 361 students from other disciplines and other schools (Architecture, Music, Health 
Technologies, collected in 2009) and 312 common citizens (inhabitants of an urban, Lisbon, and a rural county, Vila 
Verde dos Francos – Alenquer, both collected in 2006). 
 
2. A brief review of previous studies 
 
As a reminder of those arguably the most important works on our subject-matter, we may refer that it has been 
evidenced in Free-Rider Experiments that first-year graduate students of economics contribute with an average of less 
than half the amount donated to a public fund by students of other disciplines (see Marwell and Ames, 1981). 
Simultaneously, in an two-person Ultimatum Bargaining Game, in which one person (the Proposer) suggests a division 
of $10 between him/herself and a second person (the Responder), on average economics students propose, and also 
tend to accept, smaller amounts (see Carter and Irons, 1991). Analogously, in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiment, 
economics majors defect significantly more often (60 percent) than non-majors (30 percent), and the probability of an 
economist to defect is 0.17 higher than for a non-economist (see Frank et al., 1993). On the other hand, in a Real-
World (Lost Letter) Experiment, Yezer et al. (1996) contradict previous results, noticing that economics students return 
significantly more letters than other students, yet still, after conducting an Experimental Solidarity Game, Selten and 
Ockenfels (1998) conclude that economists give significantly less than non-economists. 
Partly against the trend, Laband and O.Beil (1999), by comparing the incidence of “cheating” on their Association 
dues, found that professional economists are significantly more honest/cooperative than professional political 
scientists and sociologists. But in an Experiment on Corruption, led by Frank and Schulze (2000), economics students 
reveal to be significantly more prone to corruption than others, notwithstanding the fact that first-year students behave 
no differently than older students, and Meier and Frey (2004), observing the Actual (Real Life) Behavior of students 
with respect to anonymously donating money to a charitable fund, conclude that the willingness to behave pro-socially 
is lower for economics and business students. Finally, Wang, Malhotra and Murnighan (2011) assessed the potential 
effects of economics teaching on greed, with three studies using multiple methods. On the whole, it is fair to say that 
we are left with a mixture of contradictory evidence, yet still mostly pointing to selfish behavior as a consequence of 
studying economics. 
 
3. A survey on the social building of trust in Portugal 
 
Our contribution in this paper is supported by a different kind of empirical evidence, namely the results of a survey 
about the Social Building of Trust in Portugal. This survey consisted of a detailed questionnaire filled in by four 
groups. Two of them are the ones initially inquired, in 2006: the first corresponds to 312 ordinary citizens, inhabitants 
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of two parishes (one urban and one rural), samples in both cases mostly composed by elderly, henceforth this group 
being here designated as “commoners”; the second comprises 376 students of economics and business, from ISEG 
(School of Economics and Management – University of Lisbon), henceforth named “economists”. Three years later, 
in 2009, a third group was inquired: 361 students from other scientific areas considerably apart from economics 
(architecture, health technologies and music), henceforth named “other students”. This third group was included in a 
second stage of the research, mostly in order to check and disentangle the possible effects of the considerable age-
disequilibrium between “economists” and non-economists initially participant. Still later on, in 2012, a fourth group 
was also inquired, composed of a new set of 650 economics students, again from ISEG, University of Lisbon, studying 
at both graduation and post-graduation (Master) levels. The inclusion of this fourth group allowed us to test the 
permanence of traits identified as specifically correspondent to economists, simultaneously confronting attitudes 
previous to the occurrence of the present economic crisis with those emerging subsequently to it.  
Personal interviews were made to all respondents, in order to explain and better control the answers to 50 questions 
about political, economic, social and cultural dimensions of trust and behavior in general. This is a much more detailed 
survey than the well-known World Value Survey. There is no gender bias in either of the groups, but strong age and 
instruction biases are present, with mostly considerably aged and poorly instructed non-academics, or “commoners” 
being inquired, and of course rather young “economists” as well as other students, and therefore an undesirable global 
lack of middle-aged people. 
 
4. The (potential) indoctrinating effects of teaching economics 
 
We will now proceed to the discussion of the most important results as to detecting the potential indoctrinating 
effects of teaching economics on values, attitudes and social and political behavior at large, as far as these three groups 
are concerned. 
Starting with two political variables, “Vote in Parliamentary Elections” and “Self-image in political (left/right) 
terms” (Tables 1 and 2), we can verify that economics students are more right-wing leaning - to the center-right 
(Partido Social Democrata: PSD, which is a relatively conservative party, despite the name) and right (Centro 
Democrático Social: CDS, which is a clearly conservative party) – parts of the spectrum of the Portuguese political 
system, both in actual vote and self-image.  
 
Table 1. Vote in last parliamentary elections 
 
Commoners 
2006 
Economics students  
2006 
Other students  
2009 
Economics students  
2012 
Left 7.4% 16.2% 23.5% 8.1% 
Center-Left 55.6% 30.1% 17.6% 14.9% 
Center-Right 18.2% 28.6% 8.8% 35.1% 
Right 2.4% 6.6% 2.9% 14.7% 
Other 0.7% 0.4% 5.9% 3.3% 
Abstention 15.8% 18.1% 41.2% 23.9% 
 
      Table 2. Self-image in political (left/right) terms 
 
Commoners 
2006 
Economics students  
2006 
Other students  
2009 
Economics students  
2012 
Left 16.3% 13.3% 14.7% 9.7% 
Center 53.8% 44.8% 34.9% 46.0% 
Right 8.9% 21.5% 5.5% 24.9% 
DK/NA 20.9% 20.4% 44.9% 19.4% 
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Notice that both economics students and other students have a vote orientation less focused on the so-called “Big 
Center” (PS, Partido Socialista, plus PSD), or rather more prone to “extreme”, or “radical” options, but whereas 
economics students lean to the right, other students lean to the left (for our purposes including Coligação Democrática 
Unitária, of which the Portuguese Communist Party is the senior member, plus Bloco de Esquerda, Left Block) or to 
abstention. Moreover, the right-wing leaning of “economists” has clearly grown from 2006 to 2012, both in terms of 
vote and of self-perception. 
The third variable considered in this study is the respondents’ opinion regarding the desirable regulation of the 
economy (Table 3) and, arguably as expectable, economics students are clearly much more pro-market. Interestingly 
enough, however, other students are even more pro-state than (relatively elderly) commoners. The generic pattern of 
answers is valid for “economists” both in 2006 and in 2012, indeed setting them quite apart from the remaining 
population. 
 
Table 3. Desirable regulation of the economy 
 
Commoners  
2006 
Economics students  
2006 
Other students  
2009 
Economics students  
2012 
More State 42.5% 23.3% 40.7% 31.7% 
More Market 23.4% 56.0% 18.3% 44.9% 
More 3rd Sector 15.4% 9.3% 8.6% 5.7% 
DN/NA 18.8% 11.4% 32.4% 17.7% 
 
Concerning the importance acknowledged to collective national problems, the single most important trait to be 
highlighted is the fact that all categories of students systematically tend to recognize a lesser importance to those than 
what is admitted by commoners (see Table 4). An age factor is here clearly present, but that is not all: indeed, 
economists typically declare to feel even less concerned by national problems than other students, with the partial 
exception of 2012 respondents, in which case the inclusion of an elder age-cohort, correspondent to mostly already 
professionally integrated Master students, partly reverts that trend.  
 
Table 4. What degree of importance do you acknowledge to collective national problems? 
 
Commoners  
2006 
Economics students  
2006 
Other students  
2009 
Economics students  
2012 
<=15% 40.0% 72.4% 65.4% 60.5% 
>15% and <50% 55.1% 25.2% 26.9% 36.5% 
>=50% 1.2% 1.1% 0.3% 1.5% 
DK/NA 3.7% 1.3% 7.5% 1.5% 
 
However, and in a clear-cut difference with the patterns identified for the previous question, if we consider now the 
interest regarding politics the most important trait to be noticed is the fact that, whereas other students usually declare 
an interest that is considerably below the level of commoners, economists on their turn show a comparatively high 
percentage of those answering “plenty” or “some”.  
Answers to the question “How do you assess the real influence of Portuguese citizens in the course of political 
events in Portugal?” do also reveal interesting patterns: notwithstanding having no bigger-than-average interest in 
national problems (see Table 5), economists still declare a clearly higher interest in politics. It seems reasonable to 
assume that, at least in part, this increased interest in politics is a direct result of the assessment made regarding 
citizens’ influence in politics: economists indeed tend to make estimations of that influence higher than other groups 
(see Table 6). Also, this is probably a trend correlate with the growing prevalence within political discourse of mental 
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dispositions and rhetorical devices that are originally from economics. In other terms, it is reasonable to assume this 
aspect as accompanied by a markedly utilitarian approach by economists to this whole group of subject-matters: 
although having no bigger-than-average interest in national problems, economists have a higher interest in politics due 
to the fact they perceive utilitarian motives for that, among other things because they very probably deem to be more 
qualified than common citizens, and also out of having a strong persuasion of being somehow capable of effectively 
exerting a relevant influence over the course of events. 
 
Table 5. Interest regarding politics 
 
Commoners 
2006 
Economics students  
2006 
Other students  
2009 
Economics students  
2012 
None 28.0% 6.6% 28.3% 5.4% 
Low 25.8% 25.2% 47.6% 22.8% 
Some 34.8% 48.8% 17.7% 49.2% 
Plenty 11.4% 17.0% 4.4% 21.4% 
DK/NA 0.0% 2.4% 1.9% 1.2% 
 
Table 6. Assessment of the influence of citizens in the course of political events 
 
Commoners 
2006 
Economics students  
2006 
Other students  
2009 
Economics students 
 2012 
Plenty 8.0% 10.3% 7.5% 10.6% 
Some 36.3% 37.1% 33.0% 38.2% 
Low 28.0% 42.4% 41.8% 41.7% 
None 13.2% 5.8% 7.5% 6.0% 
DK/NA 14.5% 4.2% 10.2% 3.5% 
 
The next variable indicates a significant age effect: young people (students of all courses) declare in a significant 
proportion to trust on others in general, while older persons overwhelmingly (80%) tend to “expect the worst”. 
Moreover, and contrary to what we could prima facie expect from the self-interest model of indoctrination, economics 
students are declaredly even more trust-prone than other students. We should, however, consider with more detail the 
real meaning referred by respondents to “trust”, which very likely comes mostly associated with feelings and notions 
stemming out of self-reliance. Economists may well be considered to be not so much a generically trust-prone group, 
rather mostly inclined to self-reliance, indeed considerably more self-reliant than other students (see Table 7). This 
interpretation seems fully consistent, for instance, with the bigger persuasion of a significant influence of citizens in 
the course of political events, as previously noticed. 
 
Table 7. Trust or distrust others in general 
 
Commoners  
2006 
Economics students 
2006 
Other students 
 2009 
Economics students  
2012 
Trust 19.7% 31.6% 23.3% 30.8% 
Expect the worst 78.5% 53.3% 59.0% 55.4% 
DK/NA 1.8% 15.1% 17.7% 13.8% 
 
Regardless of all other considerations, one important outcome of our research is the existence of strong empirical 
evidence of more selfish behavior by economics students, a fact that is rather consistent with most of previous literature 
results. In fact, their answers are clearly more supportive of the alleged legitimacy of various anti-social behaviors: 
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free-riding in claiming undue social benefits (Table 8), tax avoidance (Table 9) and throwing garbage into the street 
(Table 10). 
 
Table 8. Legitimacy of free-riding in social benefits 
 
Commoners 
2006 
Economics students  
2006 
Other students  
2009 
Economics students  
2012 
None 79.7% 54.9% 63.7% 60.0% 
Low 10.5% 31.3% 19.9% 25.8% 
Some 8.3% 7.7% 8.0% 7.8% 
Plenty 0.6% 2.7% 2.8% 3.2% 
DK/NA 0.9% 3.4% 5.5% 3.1% 
 
In the case of the perceived legitimacy of tax avoidance, other students globally occupy a position closer to 
economists, whereas concerning the issue of free-riding in social benefits the divisive factor of studying economics 
emerges much more strongly, “other students” occupying a position between “economists” and “commoners”, but 
closer to these. As regards throwing garbage into the street, again other students occupy an intermediate position. 
 
Table 9. Legitimacy of tax avoidance 
 
Commoners 
2006 
Economics students  
2006 
Other students  
2009 
Economics students  
2012 
None 85.2% 63.4% 63.7% 60.8% 
Low 5.8% 19.6% 23.0% 21.2% 
Some 5.5% 11.7% 6.1% 12.3% 
Plenty 2.5% 2.7% 2.2% 2.6% 
DK/NA 0.9% 2.7% 5.0% 3.1% 
 
Table 10. Legitimacy of throwing garbage in the street 
 
Commoners 
2006 
Economics students  
2006 
Other students  
2009 
Economics students  
2012 
None 96.3% 70.3% 79.5% 66.0% 
Low 2.2% 21.0% 15.2% 24.5% 
Some 0.6% 4.0% 1.4% 4.5% 
Plenty 0.6% 1.3% 0.8% 2.5% 
DK/NA 0.3% 3.4% 3.0% 2.6% 
 
Partly in contrast with the three previous variables, the last one is again a very good indicator that age is also an 
important factor, in some cases clearly overwhelming the indoctrination effects: a significant proportion of both 
“economists” and “other students” declare to acknowledge some legitimacy to free-riding in public transports, which 
configures much probably a typically defiant attitude of youngsters, more than a strictly selfish or anti-social behavior; 
at any rate, something likely to be considered more in the vicinity of provocative behavior and/or risk-loving 
inclination than referring to strict free-riding (Table 11). 
 
5. Conclusions 
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The main purpose of this paper was to contribute to the large literature regarding the indoctrinating effects of 
economics education, adding some empirical evidence from a survey about the social building of trust in Portugal. 
Eight variables were used to assess political and social behavior of four samples with particular characteristics: 376 
economics students, 312 mostly elderly commoners, 361 students from other disciplines/courses, plus other 650 
economics students  
We concluded that economics students are more right-wing leaning, both in actual vote and self-image, and have a 
more pro-market set of beliefs, as expected. In these cases, the age factor likely induces less “center” in general and 
bigger importance of political “extremes”, but economics apparently propitiates “right” rather than “left” in choices. 
It also propitiates a pro-market attitude, as opposed to what happens with strongly pro-statist “other students”. 
 
Table 11. Legitimacy of free-riding in public transports 
 
Commoners 
2006 
Economics students  
2006 
Other students  
2009 
Economics students  
2012 
None 91.4% 40.3% 44.6% 38.9% 
Low 3.4% 33.4% 33.2% 33.4% 
Some 3.4% 19.1% 14.1% 20.0% 
Plenty 1.2% 4.0% 4.2% 4.5% 
DK/NA 0.6% 3.2% 3.9% 3.2% 
 
As regards attitudes vis-à-vis politics, another relevant trait worth noting consists of economists having a bigger 
interest for it, notwithstanding the fact that they care even less for national problems than other youngsters. This fact 
appears to be the result of a bigger self-estimation, regarding their capacity to exert influence over events; but it is also 
reasonable to assume that the crescent colonization of political life by a variety of rhetoric and mental schemes mostly 
derived from economics somehow contributes for predisposing young economists for politics.  
Economics students declare also having more generic trust in others, apparently in contradiction to the self-interest 
model of indoctrination. However, they clearly tend as well to have a more selfish behavior, consistent with most of 
previous literature results. This fact suggests a hypothesis for explaining the officially trust-prone attitude as indeed 
mostly an expression of self-confidence: the kind of belief in the virtues of self-help that youth obviously propitiates, 
and economics further reinforces. 
Indeed, we must recognize there is also, in a number of cases, probably a prevalent influence of age, as opposed to 
indoctrination effects of economics, namely concerning the generalized conservative attitudes among the elderly 
(“expect the worst” rather than trust in others, and “do not break the rules”), versus a “radical”, risk-loving behavior 
among youngsters (trust in others “whatever may happen”, and accept free-riding in public transports: “we’ll manage 
to escape”). Therefore, we are forced to recognize that a blend of free-riding and risk-love are entangled in most of 
these questions - notice particularly the fact of “other students” systematically occupying an intermediate position 
between “commoners” and “economists” in all these last items: measurement of declared trust in others and of 
inclination for free-riding. 
Finally, it is important to recognize the limitations of studies like this. First of all, the difficulty of testing the “self-
selection” versus “indoctrination” hypotheses (self-selection assuming “natural-born economists”, indoctrination the 
idea that “economists are made”), or in other terms clarifying the “nature-versus-nature” problem. Secondarily, the 
usual problems of survey results in general are also present here: do people mean what they say? Do people do what 
they mean? In order to overcome these limitations, more research is intended for the next future. 
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